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A Private-Public Comparison of Bus Service Operators 
 
[Abstract]  Because bus ridership has been steadily declining, bus companies, especially those 
operating in the public sector, find themselves in the difficult situation of being unable to provide bus 
service without government assistance.  The main purpose of this study is to determine the key factors 
causing differences in efficiency between private and public bus operators, especially with regard to the 
following areas:  efficiency in service production, wage, and cost.  In our analysis, we use the 
econometric function to estimate the cost function of bus services and the wage function.  Our analytical 
results suggest that the total operating cost of public bus operators is 20.2% higher than that of private bus 
operators, and that the wages of public bus operator employees are 14.5% higher than those of private bus 
operator employees. 
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1 Introduction 
Due to the steady increase in the use of private autos in Japan, the bus business is facing hard 
times.  In particular, bus services owned by public organizations have been struggling with increases in 
operating deficits and subsidies, so that recently in many cities there has been a call for restructuring.  
Publicly and privately owned bus operators co-exist in the Japanese market.  Although their financial 
situation is not completely healthy, privately owned bus operators have performed better than their 
publicly owned counterparts.  Moreover, a new transportation policy  allowing easier entry into the 
market will be introduced in February, 2002, presumably increasing competition and further highlighting 
the difficulties faced by the publicly operated bus companies, with the result that there might be calls for 
their privatization, in a scenario similar to what happened with the former Japan National Railways. 
The main purpose of this study is to f ind the key factors causing differences in efficiency 
between private and public bus operators, especially in these areas: efficiency in service production, wage, 
and costs.  In this study, we will make an analysis using observations of both private and public bus 3 
operators in the Kansai region in Japan for the five years from FY1997 to 2000.  After we explain the 
current situation of the bus industry in Japan, we examine the performance differences between the two 
sectors.  For our analysis, we use econometric methods to estimate the cost function of bus services and 
the wage function.  Based on these functions, we will evaluate the differences in efficiency between 
private and public bus operators. 
 
2 An Overview of the Bus Service Industry 
  Although buses provide an important service in public transportation in Japan, the bus industry 
is in trouble.  There are several problems:  1) a continuous decline in ridership; 2) operating deficits; 3) 
decreasing financial support from the government to operators; 4) large cost differences between public 
and private operators; and 5) a difficulty in maintaining bus service in small communities.  An overview 
of Japan’s route bus transportation can be seen in Table 1. 
The number of passengers transported by route bus declined steadily after 1970, when route bus 
transported about 10 billion passengers up to 2000, when the number had shrunk to 4.8 billion, 47% of the 
1970 figure.  More surprisingly, the numbers transported by route bus decreased by about 1 billion 
passengers, a 17% decrease, over a period of only 5 years, from 1995 to 2000.  Average usage of bus 
transportation was about 96 times per person annually in 1970 but had decreased to only 38 times, a 
dramatic change compared to the less drastic loss of business of other public transportation modes such as 
railways. 
There were 444 route bus operators 444 in 2000, of which 399 operators, or 85%, were privately 
owned.  Even, in 1970, 84.4% of all route bus operators were private, showing that private operators have 
long played an important role in the bus industry.  Despite the decrease in the number of passengers, 4 
the number of bus companies has increased since 1985, with most companies entering the market being 
privately owned. 
 
Table 1 Overview of Route Bus Transport in Japan 
Year  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
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(1) This table was derived by the authors using statistics from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(2002), pp.25-32. 
(2) The number in parentheses is the ratio to the number in 1970. 
 
Although the demand for route bus transportation has sharply decreased, the output of route bus 
transportation changed less drastically.  While the number of passengers transported by route bus 
decreased by the year 2000 to 47% of the 1970 figure, vehicle kilometer remained at 93% of the 1970 
level , a fact indicating that the load factor per bus vehicle has sharply declined over the past two decades. 
  One important characteristic of the bus industry in Japan is that bus operators in the Japanese 
bus industry are generally small.  Table 2 shows the size distribution of bus operators from various points 
of view.  By any measure, bus operators are small.  If there exist scale economies in the bus industry, 
these small operators certainly face cost disadvantages. 5 
 
Table 2 Size Distribution of Bus Operator in Japan in FY2000 


















- 10  97 (21.8)  - 10   66 (14.9)  - 10*  38  (8.6)  - 50  56 (12.6) 
11 - 30  91 (20.5)  11 - 30   75 (16.9)  11 - 30  82 (18.5)  51 – 100  50 (11.3) 
31 - 50  51 (11.5)  31 - 50   52 (11.7)  31 - 50  68 (15.3)  101 – 500  103 (23.2) 
51 - 100  63 (14.2)  51 - 100   64 (14.4)  51 - 100  65 (14.6)  501 – 1000  46 (10.4) 
101 - 200  64 (14.4)  101 - 300  106 (23.8)  101 - 200  37  (8.3)  1001 – 5000  103 (23.2) 
201 - 300  29  (6.5)  301 - 500   35 (7.9)  201 - 500  54 (12.2)  5001 - 10000   21 (4.7) 
301 - 500  18  (4.1)  501 - 1000   26 (5.9)  501 -   55 (12.4)  10001 -    20 (4.5) 
501 -  31  (7.0)  1000 -   20 (4.5)  Public  45 (10.1)  Public  45 (10.1) 
Total  444 (100.0)  Total  444 (100)  Total  444 (100.0)  Total   444(100.0) 
(Source): Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2002), p.26 
(Note):  
(1)  The item “less than 10 million in capital (*)” includes individual ownership companies (2 companies). 
(2)  Numbers in parentheses are percentages (%). 
 
  Both public and private operators have been suffering from financial deficits, as shown in Table 
3.   A  surprising 78.5% of p rivate bus operators have been producing deficits, while almost 100% of 
public bus operators show deficits.  Private bus companies, despite their deficits, are able to survive 
because of government subsidies from the national government, although these have declined in recent 
years.  For example, subsidies in FY1995 were 8923.8 million yen for 161 operators but have decreased 
to only 7089.6 million yen for 164 operators.  Due to government budget problems, subsidies have 
continuously decreased.   The main reason why public operators are more deficit-prone is that public 
operators have higher costs per unit.  As Table 4 shows, on average, the costs of public operators are 
twice as high as those of private operators.  Although other factors besides ownership are important, 




Table 3 Financial Situation of Route Bus Operators in FY2000 
  Making profit  Making deficit  Total 
Private operator  40 (21.5%)  146 (78.5%)  186 (100.0%) 
Public operator  1  (3.1%)  31 (96.9%)  32 (100.0%) 
Total  41 (18.8%)  177 (81.2%)  218 (100.0%) 
(Source): Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2002), p.32 
(Note):  
(1)  These numbers are for operators owning more than 30 vehicles. 
 
Table 4 Average Cost Comparison Between Private and Public Operators in FY2000 
Private operators  Public operators 
Total  Operating costs  Non-  Total  Operating costs  Non- 
































1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  2.10  2.07  2.32  1.51  3.43 
(Source): Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2002), p.34 
(Note):  
(1)  Numbers in the first row are average costs in yen per vehicle kilometer. 
(2)  Numbers in parentheses are percentages (%). 
(3)  Numbers in the second row are relative indices when numbers of private operators are one. 
 
3 An Ownership Comparison 
3.1 Previous Studies 
  Many studies have been done comparing the private and public sectors in the bus industry in 
terms of efficiency (costs and/or productivity differences).  For example, Anderson (1983) investigates 
the effect of government ownership and subsidies on performance in the U.S. bus transit industry from 
1960 to 1975.  Her  methodology is to construct regression models while controlling for several factors 
which affect performance.  Although she  admits that bureaucratic growth, inefficiency and 
vote-maximization theories are supportable, she ultimately concludes that inefficiency and  bureaucratic 
growth are associated with passive sponsorship and the large size of a firm, rather than with  public 
ownership.  Perry, Babitsky and Gregersen (1988) review 20 studies from three countries (mostly the 
U.S.) on the relationship between performance of the fixed-route bus and organizational form.  They 7 
conclude that previous research has not made a persuasive case for the whole-scale privatization of either 
ownership or management of urban mass transit organizations.  As for  operating efficiency, they 
conclude that neither ownership nor management variations appear to have predictable associations with 
operating efficiency.  However, they find that labor costs appear to be positively associated with public 
ownership. 
  However, studies showing that private operators are more efficient than public operators are not 
uncommon (see Table 5).  For example, Tittenbrun (1996)’s summary suggests that private is more 
efficient.  Hensher (1988) compares private and public urban bus operators’ costs by comparing unit costs 
for those operators in his sample located in Sydney.  He found that both driver costs and total operating 
costs for the public operators are higher than those for private operators.  The m ajor reasons why the 
private sector’s costs are so much lower are the lack of demarcation between jobs, the use of part-time 
employees, much better driver utilization, the lower number of maintenance staff per bus, and the smaller 
number of days lost through sickness.  Morlok and Viton (1985) compare the cost differences between 
private and public transit firms.  They show that private firms do produce transit service at less cost than 
public firms and posit the circumstances in which private sector operations would be expected to be less 
costly.   
  The biggest problem with previous studies is that they did not control for factors besides the 
ownership effect on costs, productivity and wages.  Many studies are simply comparisons of performance 
measures in selected cases.  S tudies controlling other factors, such as  one by  Anderson using  the 
regression technique, are not common.  It is important, therefore, to investigate whether or not the 
ownership effect is relevant to efficiency.   We have to control especially factors such as output size, 
service qualities such as load factor and peak ratio, network conditions such as bus stop spacing and 8 
network size and demand conditions. 
 
Table 5 A summary of previous private–public comparisons of efficiency 
    More efficient sector   
Study  Country  private  No 
difference 
public  Source 
Nelson (1972)  U.S.      X  (a) 
Foster (1973)  U.S.      X  (a) 
OECD (1975)  U. S.  
(New York City ) 
X      (b) 
Oelert (1976)  West Germany  X      (b) 
King and Erlbaum (1977)  U.S.    X    (a) 
Holthoff and Knighton (1977)  U.S.  X      (a) 
Pozdena (1977)  U.S.      X  (a) 
Wallis (1979)  Australia  X      (b) 
Wallis (1980)  Australia  X      (c) 
Tunbridge and Jackson (1980)  U.K.  X      (c) 
Feibel and Walters (1980)  Developing countries  X      (b) 
Barbour and Zerillo (1982)  U.S. (New York)  X      (a) 
Pucher (1982)  U.S.  X      (a) 
Southern California Association of 
Governments (1982) 
U.S. (Los Angels)  X      (c) 
Cox (1983)  U.S. (Cleveland)  X      (c) 
Anderson (1983)  U.S.    X    (d) 
Pucher and Markstedt (1983)  U.S.  X 
 
    (e) 
Morlok and Viton (1985)  U.S. (New York City 
Suburbs) 
X      (c) 
Perry and Babitsky (1986)  U.S.  X      (f) 
Thriez (1986)  Turky (Istanbul) and India 
(Calcutta) 
X      (b) 
Hensher (1988)  Australia (Sydney)  X      (g) 
De Rus and Nombela (1997)  Spain 
 
X      (h) 
(Note): 
(a) Perry, J. L., T. Babitsky, H. Gregersen (1988), (b) Tittenbrun (1996), (c) Morlok and Viton (1985), (d) Anderson 
(1983), (e) Pucher and Markstedt (1983), (f) Perry and Babitsky (1986), (g) Hensher (1988), (h) De Rus and Nombela 
(1997) 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
  Based on previous studies, we carefully selected our observations.  Table 6 shows a list of the 
bus companies taken as examples for this analysis. 
First, in order to create relatively similar demand and competition (i.e. with private auto) 9 
conditions, we selected observations  from the same region.  T he selected observations are  twenty 
organizations, both publicly and privately owned companies, from the Kansai Region.  Publicly owned 
bus operators are all municipal (city) governments’ operators while private bus operators are joint stock 
companies.  We gathered data for these organizations from the fiscal years 1997 through 2000, giving us 
a total of 68 observations.  Our data was derived from several sources but the cost data in particular were 
obtained from Kobe city, and are statistics originally collected by the Japan Bus Association..   
 
Table 6  List of bus operators used for this study 
No  Name of company  Type  No  Name of company  Type 
1  Hankyu Bus  Private  10  Shinki Bus  Private 
2  Keihan Bus  Private  11  Osaka City  Public 
3  Nankai Bus  Private  12  Kyoto City  Public 
4  Kintetsu Bus  Private  13  Kobe City  Public 
5  Hanshin Bus  Private  14  Takatsuki City  Public 
6  Sanyo Bus  Private  15  Amagasaki City  Public 
7  Kyoto Bus  Private  16  Itami City  Public 
8  Keihan Uji Kotsu  Private  17  Akashi City  Public 
9  Kongo Jidosya  Private       
 
3.3 A Performance Comparison Between Private and Public Operators 
  A comparison of major performance measures of the selected organizations is summarized in 
Table 7.  T his table shows that the operating revenue cost ratios of private and public bus operators are 
similar, with both creating operating deficits.  The fact that both the average operating revenues and the 
average operating costs of public operators are larger than those of private operators might imply that the 
size and fare of public operators are larger than those of private operators, in addition to the ownership 
being different. 
Wage level also differs greatly between the two sectors, with that of public operators about 61% 
higher than that of private operators.  However, this wage differential between these sectors might be the 
result of carrier differences in addition to difference in ownership.  Furthermore, operating conditions are 10 
different between the two sectors.  Public operators have more passengers per operator, shorter average 
route length, and shorter bus stop spacing.  T hese results show that we must control operating conditions. 
 
Table 7 A private-public comparison of performance in selected organization 
Measure  Definition  Unit  Public  Private 
Operating revenue cost 
ratio 
Operating revenues / 
operating costs 
-  0.811  0.882 
Average operating 
revenue 
Operating revenues / 
vehicle kilometer 
Yen / vehicle-km  760  458 
Average operating cost  Operating costs / vehicle 
kilometer 
Yen / vehicle-km  882  438 




17,701  22,111 
Average monthly wage  Total salary expenditure per 
month / number of persons paid 
Yen / person  981,133  601,865 
Passenger density 
 
Number of passengers / number 
of routes 
Person / route  39,300  33,343 
Number of passengers 
per operator 
Number of passengers  1000 Person 
 
60,456  29,447 
Bus density  Vehicle kilometer / route 
kilometer 
-  21,021  6,751 
Average route length 
 
Route kilometer / route  km  6.5  11.2 
Daily bus operation 
 
Number of bus operations per 
day 
Number of 
operation / day 
3,496  2,298 
Average bus stop 
spacing 
Route kilometer / number of bus 
stops 
km  1.000  2.698 
 
 
4  Model 
4.1 Cost Model 
  Since Viton (1981), who was most likely the first to do so, estimated the translog function for 
the urban bus system in the early 80’s, many cost studies have been done for a wide variety of reasons.  
For instance, studies have evaluated scale economies, deregulation effects, and the effects of subsidies on 
cost structure.  But the most common model of cost function  is the translog function, for example, 
Williams and Hall (1981), Tauchen, Fravel and Gilbert (1983), Obeng (1984, 1985), Berechman and 
Gilliano (1984), Andrikopoulos, Loizidis and Prodromidis (1992) and Fazioli, Fillippini and Prioni (1993).  11 
Although more recently other methods have appeared in the literature--for example, the stochastic cost 
frontier model (Jorgensen, Pedersen and Volden, 1997) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (Cowie and 
Asenova, 1999) have been applied to bus industry—the translog model is still well used, as in de Rus and 
Nombela (1997) and Matas and Raymond (1998). 
In this study, we followed the general structure of the cost model for bus firms, a model which 
has already been developed in previous studies.  That is, we assumed the cost function as a function of 
output ( Q), input factor prices (w) and output conditions (H).  I n this study, we specify the output 
measure as a single output.  But there might be a possibility of aggregation bias on output because the 
output conditions such as service characteristics and network conditions could be different among bus 
operators. Therefore, we include the output conditions (H) such as output characteristics and network 
characteristics in the cost function.  In this study, the quantity of output is measured as annual vehicle 
kilometer.  Variables of output conditions are bus stop spacing, peak ratio and the average load of bus 
service. Furthermore, we include the ownership dummy variable (D) as a fixed effect in the cost function, 
because our main purpose is to evaluate how the ownership difference affects the cost structure of the 
route bus operation.  The cost function is generally expressed as follows: 
   
C = C (Q, H, w, D),              (1) 
  where  C: total cost 
    Q: quantity of output 
    H: output condition 
    w: input factor prices 
D: ownership dummy variables. 
 12 
Furthermore, in this study, we employ a translog cost function, as other cost studies have done.  
Among previous studies, our cost model is very similar to Mizutani (1994) and de Rus and Nombela 
(1997).  The specific translog cost model used here is shown as follows: 
 
  lnC= a0 + aQ lnQ + Sibilnwi + SmmmlnHm   + (1/2) aQQ (lnQ)
2 + (1/2) SjSibij (lnwi) (lnwj)
 + 
    + (1/2) SnSmmmn (lnHm) (lnHn) + SigQi (lnQ)(lnwi) + SmgQm (lnQ)(lnHm) + 
  SmSi gim( lnwi) (lnHm) + d D,                   (2) 
where  C: total operating cost 
    Q: output measure 
  wi: input factor price (i (or j) = L1 (driver), L2 (non-driver), E (energy),   
K (material and capital), S (other service)) 
Hm: operating condition ( m (or n) = BS (bus stop spacing), PK (peak ratio),   
LD (average load)) 
  D : ownership dummy (public =1, private = 0). 
 
In this model, we impose the restriction on input factor prices such that Sibi = 1, SigQi =0, Smgimi 
=0.  Other restrictions are as follows:bij = bji , mmn = mnm .  Furthermore, we apply Shephard’s Lemma on 
the total cost function.  Then we can obtain the input share equations as follows: 
 
  si = bi + Sjbij (lnwj)
 + gQi (lnQ) + Smgim (lnHm),          (3) 
  where si  : input i’s share of total operating cost. 
 
  As for the estimation technique, we apply the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) by 
Zellner (1962) for the total cost function and the input share equations.  Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that we normalize the observation on each variable by dividing by its sample mean, before making the 
natural logarithmic transformation.  In the actual estimation, we drop the price of other factor price (wS) 
from equations (2) and (3) by using the condition, bS = 1 - bL1 - bL2 - bE - bK . 13 
 
3.2 Wage Function 
  In this section, we employ the wage function to evaluate the wage difference between private 
and public bus operators.  As for the attributes of wage of bus operators, we chose four variables: 
average employed years(T), working conditions(R), job type dummy (X) and ownership dummy(D).  In 
the literature of labor economics, other factors such as education and training history are also used to 
explain the wage, but we could not include these variables because of the unavailability of data.  
Furthermore, the average age of each organization could also be important but we excluded it because this 
variable seems to be correlated to the average employed years in our data set.  As for the functional form, 
we employed the simple log-linear function. 
 
        W = W (T , R , X  , D ),                    (4) 
Where  W: average monthly salary per employee 
    T: average employed year 
    R: working condition 
    X: job type dummy (driver =1, non-driver = 0) 
    D: ownership dummy (public = 1, private =0). 
 
  lnW = a0 + aT lnT + bR lnR + q X  + d D,                (5) 
  Where  W: average monthly salary per employee 
    T: average employed year 
    R: working condition 
    X: job type dummy (driver =1, non-driver = 0) 
    D: ownership dummy (public = 1, private = 0). 
 
4 Estimation Results 
4.1 Definition of Variables for Econometric Analysis 14 
  The variables used for the estimation of total operating cost function are defined as follows and 
shown in Table 8.  First, total operating costs (C) are the sum of labor, energy, material and capital costs 
for the operating division.  The costs of the non-operating division, which are the general administrative 
costs of the administrative division of the headquarters, are not included because these are not reported 
publicly.   
  As for output measures, we use annual vehicle kilometer (Q). In this study, the cost model is a 
single-output model with a variable of output characteristic.  However, the costs of bus operation are 
affected by operating conditions.  Certainly, previous studies on cost estimation in the bus industry 
include many kinds of variables of operating conditions.  Therefore, in order to avoid estimation bias 
based on different kinds of operating conditions, we also include three kinds of variables, which describe 
operating conditions: bus stop spacing (HBS), peak ratio (HPK), and average load (HLD).  Bus stop spacing 
is defined as the average length between bus stops.  The peak ratio is defined  as the ratio of the total 
numbers of pass users to the total number of passengers, because most  pass users are commuters.  
Finally, average load is defined as the number of passengers per vehicle per kilometer.  
We defined five kinds of input factor prices.  First,  as for labor price, we chose two kinds of 
price: the labor price of the bus operator (wL1) and the labor price of other workers (wL2).  These prices 
both are defined as the average monthly salary per employee. Therefore, we obtained these by dividing 
monthly labor costs in each category by the total number of employees. Energy price (wE) is obtained by 
dividing energy expenditures by diesel consumption.  Capital and material price (wK) is obtained here by 
dividing depreciation expenditures by total numbers of vehicles held by the organization.  Finally, the 
price of other service costs (wS), such as highway charges, insurance, and tax payment is the consumer 
price index. 15 
  As for the ownership dummy variable (D), this variable is defined as the difference in ownership, 
in which public ownership is equal to one and private ownership is equal to zero.  All public bus 
operators used here are those of municipal governments. 
 
Table 8  Definition and statistics on variables used for the estimation of total cost function 
Variable  Definition  Unit  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 




Sum of labor, energy, material, 
depreciation costs and other 
service costs 
million 
yen  8,695  8,601  517  28,525 
Q 




12,736  10,683  1,310  32,674 
wL1 
(Wage of driver) 








Average monthly salary per 
non-driver 
yen / 




Energy expenditure per diesel 
consumption  yen / litter  58.8  3.5  53.0  64.0 
wK 
















Pass users per total passengers  -  0.338  0.132  0.113  0.629 
HLD 
(Average load) 


























20,185  5,363  12,306  39,628 
 16 
As for variables for wage function, the wage per employee (w) is defined as average monthly 
salary per employee.  The average employed year (T) of the firm is used here.  This measure is defined 
as how many years an employee has worked for the firm on average.  Finally, vehicle-km per employee 
(R) is obtained by dividing vehicle kilometer by the total number of employees. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results 
  The estimation results of both cost and wage functions are shown in Table 8.  Estimation 
methods are the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) for the cost model with input share equations 
and the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression for the wage function.  The goodness-of-fit in these 
regressions is acceptably high for these models.  The estimated cost model meets almost all of the 
required properties.  First, symmetry and homogeneity in input factor prices are satisfied because 
restrictions in input factor prices are imposed.  The monotonicity and the concavity conditions in the cost 
model are satisfied at least locally.  The first-order coefficients in the cost model show the correct sign.  
As for the wage function, the coefficients show almost the correct sign.  Therefore, we decided to 
evaluate the ownership difference according to total operating cost and wage. 
  First, as for the cost function, the coefficient of  the ownership dummy shows 0.184 and is 
statistically significant at 1%, indicating that public ownership pushes total operating costs upward.  If 
other conditions such as outputs, input factor prices, and operating conditions hold the same between 
private and public bus operators, then total operating costs for the public bus operators is 20.2% higher 
than that for the private bus operators.  In spite of the fact that we control several factors which affect the 
cost difference, the ownership effect is still significant for total operating costs.  As for the wage function, 
the coefficient of the ownership dummy is statistically significant at 0.139, which is slightly lower than 17 
the case for total operating cost.  This result means that the wage level of public bus operators is about 
14.5% higher than that of private bus operators.  These results indicate that public ownership certainly 
involves higher costs and a higher wage level than private bus operators. 
 
Table 8 Estimation Results of Total Operating Cost Function and Wage Function 
Cost Function 














































           
mBS 
(bus stop spacing) 
-0.122 
(0.031) 















   
R-squared  0.996  R-squared  0.782 
Note): The full estimation result in the cost model is shown in Appendix-1.
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks   
The bus industry has suffered a decline in bus ridership has continuously due to the increase in 
use of the private auto and apparently can no longer continue to provide service without government 
assistance.  Furthermore, the deregulation of land transport introduced quite recently will create more 18 
competition, with privately owned bus operators becoming more free to enter a market where public bus 
companies have dominated.  W ith this imminent change in mind, we have focused on performance 
differences between private and public bus operators.  Our main question is whether or not public bus 
operators are less efficient than private operators, even if we control other factors.  M ost previous studies 
reporting that private bus operators are more efficient have failed to hold other factors constant.   
In our analysis,  we estimate the cost function of bus services and the wage function with 
econometric methods.  Based on our analytical results, we conclude that private bus operators are more 
efficient than their public counterparts, with the total operating cost of public bus operators being 20.2% 
higher than that of private bus operators and the wage of public bus operators 14.5% higher than that of 
private bus operators.  This result suggests that if factors besides ownership had been controlled for, the 
efficiency difference found by previous researchers might have been smaller.   
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Appendix-1 Estimation Results of Translog Cost Function 
 
Table A-1 Estimation Results of Total Operating Cost Function 
    Standard      Standard      Standard 
  Estimate  Error    Estimate  Error    Estimate  Error 
a0  11.267  0.023  bEE  0.042  0.009  gELD  0.001  0.001 
aQ 0.959  0.017  bEK  0.000  0.001  gKBS  0.004  0.002 
bL1 0.621  0.005  bKK  0.032  0.004  gKPK  0.001  0.004 
bL2  0.114  0.005  gQL1  -0.034  0.004  gKLD  0.004  0.003 
bE  0.046  0.001  gQL2  -0.002  0.005  mBSBS  -0.208  0.051 
bK  0.054  0.002  gQE  -0.001  0.001  mBSPK  0.006  0.078 
mBS  -0.122  0.031  gQK  0.000  0.002  mBSLD  -0.190  0.046 
mPK  0.121  0.073  gQBS  -0.093  0.022  mPKPK  0.335  0.136 
mLD  -0.149  0.022  gQPK  -0.096  0.047  mPKLD  -0.090  0.075 
d  0.184  0.031  gQLD  -0.080  0.028  mLDLD  -0.332  0.113 
aQQ  0.172  0.050  gL1BS  -0.001  0.005       
bL1L1  0.172  0.040  gL1PK  0.014  0.011     
bL1L2  -0.008  0.026  gL1LD  0.003  0.007     
bL1E  -0.017  0.006  gL2BS  -0.009  0.006     
bL1K  -0.036  0.008  gL2PK  -0.034  0.012     
bL2L2  0.045  0.027  gL2LD  -0.007  0.009     
bL2E  -0.025  0.004  gEBS  0.003  0.001     
bL2K  -0.005  0.007  gEPK  0.002  0.002  獱畡牥     0.996 
 
 